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Abstract
Economic experiments have shown that in mixed gender groups women are more reluctant than men
to choose tournaments when given the choice between piece rate and winner-take-all tournament
style compensation. These gender diﬀerence experiments have all relied on a framework where
subjects were not informed of their abilities relative to potential competitors. We replicate these
findings with math and word tasks, and then show that feedback about relative performance
moves high ability females towards more competitive compensation schemes, moves low ability
men towards less competitive schemes such as piece rate and group pay, and removes the average
gender diﬀerence in compensation choices. We also examine between and within-subjects diﬀerences
in choices for females across the menstrual cycle. We find women’s relative reluctance to choose
tournaments comes mostly from women in the low hormone phase of their menstrual cycle. Women
in the high hormone phase are substantially more willing to compete than women in the low phase,
though still somewhat less willing to compete than men. There are no significant diﬀerences between
the choices of any of these groups after they receive relative performance feedback.
Introduction
Economic experiments have shown when given the choice between piece rate and winner-take-
all tournament style compensation, women are more reluctant than men to choose tournaments
(e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). These gender diﬀerence experiments have all relied on a
framework where subjects were not informed of their abilities relative to potential competitors. We
use a within-subjects design and replicate these previous findings for a math task, and show they
also exist for a word task. We then show that feedback about relative performance moves high
ability females towards more competitive compensation schemes, moves low ability men towards less
competitive schemes such as piece rate and group pay, and removes the average gender diﬀerence
in compensation choices. We also examine between and within-subjects diﬀerences in choices for
females across the menstrual cycle. We find that the relative reluctance to choose tournaments on
the part of women comes mostly from women in the low hormone phase of their menstrual cycle.
Women in the high hormone phase are substantially more willing to compete than women in the low
phase, though still somewhat less willing to compete than men. There are no significant diﬀerences
between the choices of any of these groups after they receive relative performance feedback.
In low information settings, the eﬀects of gender and menstrual phase are large. A female has a
0.14 lower probability of choosing a tournament than a male, even when controlling for performance
and confidence. For a female to be as likely to choose a tournament as an average male, she must
believe she is 40% better than average in performance. The within gender menstrual phase eﬀect
is larger than the across gender eﬀect. Females in the low hormone phase of their cycle have a 0.16
lower probability of choosing a tournament than females in higher hormone phase. A low phase
female must believe she has 50% better performance to be as likely to compete as a female in the
high hormone phase.
Without feedback, high ability females and males are both more reluctant to enter tournaments
than expected value maximization would require. This eﬀect is larger for high ability females. Too
many low ability types enter competitive environments, and this eﬀect is larger for males. Relative
performance feedback moves all these groups toward more optimal choices. This result suggests
that gender diﬀerences in choices, and the choice diﬀerences we identify across the menstrual cycle,
are not driven by stable preference diﬀerences.
The corporate ladder can be considered a tournament where a number of individuals compete
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for promotion based on the results of individual performance. Females make up a small portion
of top-level executive positions. Bertrand and Hallock (2001) found that in 1997 the fraction
of females in top level management positions was 3% and only 15% of firms had at least one
female in a top level executive position. This underrepresentation of females in executive positions
may be partially explained by the roles females have in the traditional family with the raising of
children aﬀecting their career choices and human capital investments (Polachek 1981). Part of this
underrepresentation may be caused by a preference by females against tournaments or for piece
rate compensation. Jirjahn and Stephan (2004) find that the attractiveness of piece rate schemes
for females is likely caused by less wage discrimination in such a setting when performance can
easily be measured. It could be for this reason that firms with a higher proportion of females are
more likely to oﬀer piece rate compensation (Brown 1990).
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find that when given a choice between a piece rate or a winner-
take-all tournament compensation scheme, females overwhelmingly choose the piece rate while
males choose the tournament. In their experiment, subjects were given information only about
their own absolute performance and were not informed of the quality of competitors. By having
participants choose a compensation scheme for past performance from another treatment, they find
that the gender diﬀerences for competition still remain even when they control for confidence and
risk aversion. They find that the gender diﬀerence remains large while controlling for overconfidence
as 14% of the variation in competitive choices is driven by gender, suggesting that females prefer
not to compete when compared to males.
Datta Gupta, Poulsen and Villeval (2005) find similar results in an experiment examining the
eﬀects of gender in tournaments. In another experiment, Dohmen and Falk (2007) find that females
are less likely to choose variable pay schemes such as tournaments and piece rates when given the
choice of a fixed rate for their time. All these experiments used a similar protocol where subjects
were given their absolute performance, but were never informed of their relative standing within
the group. These economic experiments have been interpreted as meaning that gender diﬀerences
in self selection are derived from a preference diﬀerence between the genders where females seem
to have a greater distaste for competition than males.
Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) find that females see lower performance gains from
participating in competitive environments. In observing children’s performance in running races,
Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) also find that competition increases performance of boys, but not girls.
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In an experimental setting, Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) find that in a mixed-gender
competitive environments, males have significant performance increases when an environment is
made more competitive and females do not. However, when females compete only against other
females, their performance increases as the environment becomes more competitive. Gupta, Poulsen
and Villeval (2005) find that females are more competitive when given the opportunity to choose
the gender of a potential competitor. Specifically, females are more likely to choose to enter a
tournament if they first choose to be paired against another female before making the competitive
environment decision. Similar results have been found by Grosse and Reiner (2010) where females
seem to be more competitive when competing against other females. These results suggest that
performance in competitive environments is diﬀerent for males and females and that the gender
composition of groups may play a role in performance gains from competition, as well as in the
selection into competitive environments. Both performance diﬀerences under competition and
gender composition eﬀects may help explain the underrepresentation of females in the corporate
business world.
Grossman and Eckel (2003) provide a review of gender diﬀerences in risk preferences and find
that results seem more supportive of females being more risk averse than man, but these results are
not entirely robust. The experimental studies examining gender diﬀerences for competition argue
that gender diﬀerences in competitive choices are not driven by gender diﬀerences in risk preferences.
Ambiguity aversion might be an explanation, since in the competition experiments subjects had
little information about the probability distribution of payoﬀs. But ambiguity aversion has not been
found to vary systematically across gender. Moore and Eckel (2003) find that females are more
ambiguity averse for specific contexts and domains, while Borghans et al. (2009) find that males
are initially more ambiguity averse than females, but as ambiguity increases, males and females
behave similarly.
None of the results cited so far show that these gender diﬀerences are biologically determined.
In fact, Gneezy et al. (2009) report results from experiments in a matrilineal society in India where
women are more likely to compete than men. Cross cultural studies of this sort are one way to show
the importance, or lack of importance, of biological factors in gender diﬀerences. In this paper, we
use natural variations in the levels of hormones across the menstrual cycle to examine this same
question. We find that competitive choices do vary across the cycle. This shows that while biology
may not be the only driving factor, it does seem to play a role. Interestingly, the eﬀect is such that
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during the low hormone phase the behavioral diﬀerences are quite large, while in the high hormone
phase females choices are very similar to those of males.
Hormones have been found to aﬀect behaviors in humans. The hormone oxytocin has been
found to increase trusting behavior of individuals (Baumgartner et al. 2008). Fehr (2009) suggests
that due to such results, preferences towards trust are aﬀected by biological mechanisms. Other
hormones have also been found to matter for economic behaviors and outcomes. For males,
testosterone levels of financial traders in the morning can predict profitability through the rest
of the day. Cortisol levels in these same traders were found to rise with increased volatility in
their market returns (Coates and Herbert 2008). Testosterone levels are correlated with behaviors
in economic experiments such as oﬀers and acceptances in ultimatum games (Burnham 2007).
Financial risk taking has also been linked to circulating levels of testosterone in men (Apicella et
al. 2008).
Males and females have very diﬀerent levels of a number of hormones, including estrogen,
luteinizing hormone (LH), follicle stimulating hormone (FSH), progesterone, and testosterone (Speroﬀ
and Fritz 2005). However, it is not necessarily the case that men and women experience the same
eﬀects from these hormones. In fact, Shepard et al. (2009) point out that there are thousands of
citations in medical journals on the eﬀect of hormones on sex diﬀerences and brain organization.
This review article concludes that the expression of hormonal eﬀects within a gender may be very
dependent on the social environment.
Women exhibit large and predictable hormonal variations across the menstrual cycle (Speroﬀ
and Fritz 2005). For females, estrogen and progesterone have received most of the attention in
studies examining neuroendocrinological, psychological and behavioral eﬀects. Estrogen has been
found to increase power motivation– a reported preference for impact or dominance, suggesting
that it may aﬀect competitive preferences (Stanton and Schultheiss 2007). Such a hormonal link
with appetites for competition may be very dependent on the social context. Gneezy et al. (2003),
Datta Gupta et al. (2005), Delfgaauw et al. (2009), and Grosse and Reiner (2010) have all shown
that females are less responsive to competition and also less likely to compete against males than in
all-female settings. Using all-female groups and cross-sectional data, Buser (2010) finds that when
females have the opportunity to compete with other females they behave less competitively during
phases of the cycle typically associated with higher levels of progesterone.
Neuroendocrinology has demonstrated the existence of hormonal eﬀects on brain activity. Results
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show that major depression may be linked to reduced density of hydroxytryptamine (5-HT), also
known as serotonin, binding sites (Malison et al. 1998). By injecting estradiol in rats, Fink et al.
(1996) find that estrogen stimulates an increase in the density of 5-HT binding sites in certain areas
of the brain. Injections of estradiol significantly increase the density of binding sites in the anterior
cingulate cortex (24%), anterior frontal cortex (41%) and the nucleus accumbens (12%). These
areas of the brain have been variously linked with mood, memory, and the anticipation and receipt
of monetary rewards (Fink et al. 1996, McEwen 2002, Bethea et al. 2002, Platt and Huettel 2008).
Progesterone has been shown to inhibit neurotransmission, and as a result it may decrease anxiety
and increase sedation (Vliet 2001). Other research suggests that progesterone may decrease the
degradation of 5-HT (Bethea et al. 2002).
Sex diﬀerences in the brain develop during perinatal development where both females and
male brains are organized diﬀerently from diﬀerent exposure to steroid hormones (Gagnidze and
Pfaﬀ 2009). For female brains, estrogen masculinizes aramotose-expressing neural pathways and
also masuclinizes territorial behavior in female rodents (Wu et al. 2009).1 For females, estrogen
is required and received by the estrogen receptor to express male-type aggressive and territorial
behavior in mice (Gagnidze and Pfaﬀ 2009). Thus, estrogen for females may lead to similar behavior
for females as that induced by testosterone in males. In pre-menopausal women, it has also been
found that brain activity and activations change across diﬀerent phases of the menstrual cycle
(Dreher et al. 2007).
In this study, we focus on two stable and predictable phases of estrogen and progesterone levels
for females, an elevated hormonal phase and a low hormonal phase. As shown in Figure 1, both
progesterone and estrogen remain low during the early part of the menstrual cycle. This first week
of the cycle is when normal cycling females menstruate and can be considered a low-hormone phase.
Estrogen rises quickly and spikes just prior to ovulation, this is referred to as the follicular spike as it
occurs during the follicular phase, which is just prior to ovulation. After ovulation (approximately
day 14 in the graph), progesterone levels spike in the latter half of the female menstrual cycle, which
is called the luteal phase. During the luteal phase, females who ovulate experience heightened levels
in both progesterone and estrogen. This second spike in both hormones may be referred to as the
luteal spike or high-hormone phase (Speroﬀ and Fritz 2005, Stricker et al. 2006).
Females using a hormonal contraceptive experience suppression of endogenous hormone production
1Aromatose is an enzyme that converts testosterone to estradiol. In the adult male brain testosterone acting
through androgen receptors is necessary to complement male type behavior (Gagnidze and Pfaﬀ 2009).
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Figure 1: Hormonal Fluctuations in Normal Cycling Females
These are median values from Stricker et al. (2006)
when in the active phase of their contraceptive regimen (Speroﬀ and Fritz 2005). Both progesterone
and estrogen levels remain fairly constant as the body receives a dose of hormones exogenously
(Aden et al. 1998). During the placebo or non-active phase of the contraceptive regimen there
are no exogenous hormones being provided to the body; this lowering of both progesterone and
estrogen through exogenous means leads to withdrawal bleeding caused by the withdrawal of
exogenous hormones (Speroﬀ and Fritz 2005). There is no biological or medical necessity to induce
this withdrawal bleeding (Anderson and Hait 2003). Since menstrual bleeding is caused by low
hormones, it allows for easy identification of a low hormone phase for research purposes.
Monthly bleeding, periodic bleeding, or no bleeding–this is an individual woman’s choice
(Speroﬀ and Fritz 2005, 908).
It is suspected that keeping withdrawal bleeding as part of the hormonal contraceptive regimen
was a marketing ploy to make the birth control pill seem more socially acceptable (Coutinho and
Segal 1999). Thus, females could entirely avoid hormonal fluctuations by sustained contraceptive
use. Indeed, some forms of contraception do ensure that this occurs (Anderson and Hait 2003). If
the decrease in hormones aﬀects females in an economically costly manner then one could expect
that there is some demand to prolong contraceptive use among the female population which has
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become evident by recent prolonged-use contraceptives such as Seasonale.
Other economic studies have examined the eﬀects of the menstrual cycle and therefore implicitly
or explicitly hormonal fluctuations for females. Hormonal fluctuations occur across the female
menstrual cycle and contribute to premenstrual syndrome eﬀects, which may have significant
economic consequences. Ichino and Moretti (2009) use detailed employee attendance data from
a large Italian bank and find that absences for females below the age of 45 tend to occur according
to a 28-day cycle. These 28-day cycle absences explain about one-third of the gender gap in
employment absences at the firm. The female menstrual cycle is approximately 28 days and they
focus on females below the age of 45, who are more likely to be pre-menopausal. Ichino and
Moretti’s result provides significant support for the hormonal fluctuations of the menstrual cycle
having significant economic impacts.
In an experimental study, Chen et al. (2010) explore hormonal diﬀerences according to menstrual
cycle phase for diﬀerences between males and females auctions. They find bidding diﬀerences in
first-price auctions between females with higher bids for females in the follicular phase versus
females in the luteal phase though most of this variation is found to be driven by contraceptive
users. In contrast, Pearson and Schipper (2009) find that women bid higher than men and earn
lower profits only during the menstrual and premenstrual phases of the cycle when estrogen and
progesterone levels are lower. Another between subject experimental study, Buser (2010), finds
that in all-female groups, females participating during high levels of progesterone tend to be less
competitive.
Not all economic studies have found support for hormonal eﬀects being significant in economic
decision making. Zethraeus et al. (2009) examine 200 post-menopausal women in a double-blind
study. Participants were given either estradiol (2 mg), testosterone (40 mg) or a placebo daily for a
four week period. Then they participated in an economic experiment session that included a variety
of diﬀerent tasks looking at risk aversion, altruism, reciprocal fairness, trust and trustworthiness.
No significant diﬀerences were found when comparing the behaviors between the three diﬀerent
treatment groups of females. One should note that the lack of eﬀects in post-menopausal women
may be caused by neural receptors no longer being as sensitive to hormonal changes due to the
eﬀects of aging (Chakraborty et al. 2003).
Though a double-blind study using exogenous delivered hormones would be ideal to examine
the eﬀects of hormones for females it would not be feasible since low hormone levels cause bleeding
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in pre-menopausal females (Speroﬀ and Fritz 2005). Instead of a double-blind study, we include
a within-subject design in this experiment focusing on a comparison between the midluteal peak
and the low hormone phase that occurs during menses. This type of scheduling has been included
in experiment designs used in neuroscience to study menstrual-cycle dependent neural plasticity
(Fernandez et al. 2003). These behavioral and neurological studies lay the foundation for our
exploration of whether females behave more competitively during a high hormone phase within the
menstrual cycle.
1 Experiment Design
We use an experimental design such that females are scheduled to participate in two sessions, during
both a low and high hormonal phase of the menstrual cycle. Since females may alter their hormonal
fluctuations by taking a hormonal contraceptive, we include females taking hormonal contraceptives.
For females using hormonal contraception, during the placebo phase of the hormonal contraception
regimen, their hormone levels are the same as normal cycling females in the low-hormone phase of
their cycle. This design allows for the comparison of behaviors between females in the low phase to
those not in the low phase, while also comparing the behavior of male participants. In the following
section we explain the experimental design used to examine both the eﬀects of relative performance
feedback and the role of hormones for competitive environment selection.
Our experiment used a within-subjects design with two sessions. For normally cycling females
these sessions were scheduled during a low hormone phase (days 2 to 7 in Figure 1) and a high
hormone phase (days 18 to 25 in Figure 1) of the menstrual cycle. We intentionally avoided the
estradiol spike around day 14, because of its short duration and variability within and across
females. For females on a monthly hormonal contraceptive with a placebo week (i.e. “the pill”)
hormone levels in the placebo week are the same as normal cycling females in the low-hormone
phase (Speroﬀ and Fritz 2005). They were scheduled accordingly. During the active phase of
the contraceptive regimen females using hormonal contraceptives get the higher hormonal levels
exogenously from the pill.
An online pre-screening survey was used to recruit and schedule subjects for experiment sessions.
We limited the sample of females to those using a monophasic hormonal contraceptive or not using
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hormonal contraceptives at all.2 Using this data females were first scheduled during a predicted
high or predicted low hormone phase. This created a random assignment of hormonal phases for
experiment sessions. In comparison to simply asking females that show up for a session as to the date
of their last or expected next menstruation, we focused on scheduling across two specific hormonal
phases to minimize identification error as the menstrual cycle has a large degree of variability, so
much so, that subjects may have trouble accurately recalling and predicting menses (Crenin et al.
2004).
To help minimize identification errors, we combined the pre-screening survey with an exit survey.
The low hormone phase is easily identified by the presence of withdrawal bleeding (in both normal
cycling females and those in the placebo phase of contraceptives). The high hormone phase is more
diﬃcult to pinpoint, particularly for subjects not on contraceptives, because of variability in the
cycle. The combination of pre-screening, scheduling, and the exit survey were designed to address
this.
Previous studies on diﬀerences in competitive choices use a strictly between-subjects design
(Niederle and Vesterlund 2007, Gneezy et al. 2009). In our within-subjects design each subject
participated in one session of math tasks, and another of word tasks. It is generally believed that
females may view themselves as having worse math skills than males (Niederle and Vesterlund 2010).
For this reason females may be less likely to compete in math tasks than in word tasks. This design
is the first to examine whether there are stable diﬀerences between subjects and within subjects
for math and word based tasks.
Subjects were randomly assigned to start with a math or a word based session. In each session
tasks were performed for five diﬀerent treatments, one of which was randomly chosen for payment
at the end of the experiment. Each treatment lasted 4 minutes. In the first treatment participants
performed the task under a non-competitive piece rate compensation scheme, where pay was
entirely dependent on the individual’s own performance. In the second treatment, participants were
randomly assigned to a winner-take-all tournament with a size of two, four, or six competitors. This
second treatment provided participants with experience in a situation where their pay depended on
their own performance as well as the performance of others. In the third treatment, participants
performed the task with a group pay (revenue sharing) form of compensation. This treatment
2Monophasic hormonal contraceptives, release the same level of exogenous hormones each day for the entire non-
placebo phase of the hormonal contraceptive regimen. We excluded users of biphasic and triphasic pills, with varying
daily hormone doses.
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randomly paired participants and payment for the group’s total production was split evenly. This
third treatment can be considered the least competitive, in that pay was identical for the two
players. This type of revenue sharing allows for an individual to free-ride and not compete at all if
they so choose. As long as an individual is paired with an individual that exerts eﬀort then he or
she can still be paid without exerting any eﬀort at all.
In the final two treatments subjects were able to choose between piece rate, group pay, or a two,
four, or six person tournament. Before the fourth treatment, subjects were told their own absolute
performance, but were not told anything about the performance of others. Just before the fifth
treatment, participants were shown how all individuals in the session had performed in the first
treatment. They then chose their compensation method and performed the task again.
The math task was similar to that in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). Participants were asked
to add four randomized two-digit numbers and complete as many of these summations as possible in
4 minutes. Equations were presented to participants on a computer screen and they typed in their
answer and pressed the Enter key or clicked a Submit button on the screen. After each submission
participants were promptly shown the next equation to solve. On the screen, the equations looked
like the following:
12 + 57 + 48 + 52 =
A sheet of paper and a pencil were provided for this task, but no other form of assistance was
available.
The word task was similar to that used by Gu¨nther et al. (2008). In this task participants are
shown a letter on a computer screen and have four minutes to form as many unique words as possible
that begin with that specific letter. The letter remains on the screen for the entire four minutes and
participants enter in their word submissions in a text box below the letter. The attempted word
formations are then listed below the text box to help subjects minimize duplicate answers, since
these are counted as incorrect. Common place names (cities, countries) are acceptable, but proper
names are counted as incorrect. Plural and tense changes to root words are counted as separate and
correct answers as long as these words still begin with the appropriate letter. In the experiment,
participants were informed of the rules before beginning the task. All participants were informed
that everybody in the same session and same treatment received the same letter; thus, providing
them with a task of equivalent diﬃculty for all participants in each treatment.
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The word list used for grading words is a common English word list used by open source word
processors.3 We used a restricted group of letters for this study to limit the variation of diﬃculty
between treatments and sessions (e,f,g,h,i,l,n,o). Between 2.7% to 3.8% of all words in the word
list began with these letters.
For the piece rate compensation, the payoﬀ an individual receives is equal to the piece rate
multiplied by the production of the individual for that particular treatment. Payoﬀs for both the
math and verbal tasks were calculated in a similar manner though the base rate, in the form of
the piece rate (w), was diﬀerent for word formation tasks (ww = $0.25) and math addition tasks
(wm = $0.50), to adjust for generally higher performance in the word task. In a tournament, if an
individual has the best performance in his group then he receives the piece rate multiplied by the
size of the tournament, multiplied by his individual performance. If an individual does not have the
best performance in his tournament then he receives nothing. In the event of a tie, the individual
receives a fraction of the tournament winnings based on the number of individuals he tied with.
Subjects were not informed about whether they won or lost a tournament until all five treatments
were complete. After each treatment, and before seeing their score, subjects were asked how well
they thought they did and how well they thought the average person in the session did, and they
were paid for having accurate predictions.
Subjects were told that they could be randomly grouped with people that did not necessarily
choose the same compensation option and were therefore playing under diﬀerent rules than their
potential competitors or group members. This rule strengthens the incentive for high ability types
to choose a more competitive tournament as there is a positive probability that they may compete
against lower ability individuals. This rule also creates an incentive for low ability individuals to
choose group pay as they may be matched with high ability individuals, which would increase their
expected payoﬀs.4
2 Results
Experiment sessions took place in a computer lab at a large public university. The majority of the
219 participants were university students, characteristics are in Table 1. The average size of the
26 sessions was 14.5 participants (with a standard deviation of 4.15). The gender composition of
3Spell Checking Oriented Word Lists (SCOWL), Revision 6, August 10, 2004 by Kevin Atkinson.
4The text for experiment instructions is available in Appendix D.
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two session participants consisted of 62 females and 64 males. Using the pre and post surveys we
identified 45 females as participating in a session during a low-hormone phase of their menstrual
cycle, and 34 during both a low and a high hormone phase. The word task was used in 12 of the
sessions and the math task was used in 14 sessions. Of the 345 individual subject sessions, 165
involved the use of the word task and 180 used the math task.5
Table 1: Summary statistics of session attendees
Participant Characteristics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Age 20.52 2.81 18 33 218
Years PS 2.18 1.48 0 6 217
GPA 3.29 0.47 2 4.1 218
Live Independently 0.82 0.39 0 1 219
Female 0.5 0.5 0 1 219
Psych meds 0.09 0.28 0 1 219
Characteristics by Sessions*
Low Phase 0.14 0.34 0 1 345
Word task 0.48 0.5 0 1 345
Session Size 14.54 4.15 7 21 345
Second session 0.37 0.48 0 1 345
*126 individuals attended a second session.
Table 2 shows that men and women were similar in terms of age, GPA, and were assigned to
sessions with similar characteristics, except that on average females were in slightly larger sessions.
The session female to male ratio ranged from 0.3 to 2.3 and averaged 1.01. Thus, all sessions had
some degree of gender mix and on average this mix was about one-to-one.
Table 2: Mean values of individual and session characteristics by gender.
Sex Age Years PS GPA Indep. Meds Word Size Sess. 2
Male 20.70 2.14 3.25 0.83 0.09 0.47 13.79 0.37
Female 20.35 2.21 3.33 0.80 0.08 0.48 15.30 0.36
Total 20.52 2.18 3.29 0.82 0.09 0.48 14.54 0.37
Sessions took place three to four times a week and were held in the morning. Each session
took slightly less than an hour, including approximately 10 minutes at the beginning of the session
during which participants waited together in a foyer. This allowed participants to see that sessions
included both males and females. Once participants entered the lab, partitions were used so that
5One individual (female) was removed from the data due to inability to follow the instructions.
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participants could not see each other’s computer screens or facial responses from the feedback
received. Competition and group memberships were also anonymous.
Payouts were based on one randomly chosen treatment, excluding the flat rate show-up payment,
payouts averaged $7.38 for the math session and $15.01 for the word sessions. Participants who
attended two sessions were later asked to perform a risk aversion task similar to that used in Holt
and Laury (2002). The risk aversion tasks were performed a few days after the second session to
avoid endogeneity with competition task earnings. A total of 112 participants (56 male and 56
females) participated in the risk aversion task. The average payout for the risk aversion task was
$6.57.
2.1 Task Performance
Each individual participated in five diﬀerent treatments in each session. For the first three treatments
the compensation schemes were as follows:
Treatment 1: Piece rate ($0.50 per sum and $0.25 per word).
Treatment 2: Random sized tournament of 2, 4, or 6 individuals (the winner earned the piece rate
multiplied by the size of tournament).
Treatment 3: Group pay: an individual was paired with a randomly chosen partner and the total
production of the 2 individuals was multiplied by the piece rate and then split evenly.
Table 3: Performance Across Treatments and Gender
Math T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 Word T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
Male 10.9 12.1 12.3 12.7 12.8 Male 38.2 39.4 43.0 45.3 47.0
Female 9.9 11.4 11.8 12.3 12.1 Female 41.0 41.1 45.0 48.4 47.3
Both 10.4 11.8 12.0 12.5 12.5 Both 39.6 40.3 44.0 46.9 47.1
Table 3 shows mean performance by gender over treatments and tasks. The increasing mean
values over the first three treatments in both the math and the word tasks suggest that subjects
are learning to do the task better during the session. The across gender performance diﬀerences in
the math task are not statistically significant at 5% using two-tailed t-tests. In the word task, the
diﬀerences in performance are not statistically significant for any of the treatments. Thus, there are
no noticeable performance diﬀerences between males and females after the first treatment.6 This
6An analysis of the performance eﬀects that occur from learning and diﬀerent competitive settings are available
on request.
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lack of a performance diﬀerence by gender, for either task, removes one obvious potential reason
for gender diﬀerences in choices.
2.2 Gender Diﬀerences in Compensation Choice
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Datta Gupta et al. (2005) find that females are less likely
than males to enter tournaments when given the option between a tournament and piece rate.
To test whether these results can be replicated with our protocol, we first focus on choices made
in Treatment 4. In this treatment, as in previous studies, individuals were not given information
about their relative performance. In Treatment 5 we consider the eﬀect of relative performance
information on competitive choices.
In both Treatment 4 and Treatment 5, individuals had the opportunity to choose between
group pay (revenue sharing), piece rate, or a tournament size of two, four or six individuals. These
choices are ordered by increasing competitiveness, with sharing less competitive than not sharing
and larger tournaments being more competitive. In the figures and empirical analysis we lump
the tournaments together regardless of size, the results are robust when using an ordered scale for
tournament size.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of choices made by males and females in the first and second
sessions for Treatment 4. The gender diﬀerences are large: pooling over sessions we find that only
31% of females chose to compete in tournaments while 54% of males chose the tournaments.The
gender diﬀerence persists for the piece rate as 36% of females chose the piece rate compared to
only 20% of males. These diﬀerences are all significant at the 2% level or better with chi-square
tests. On average males and females chose consistently across the two repeated sessions, which
are often separated by a week or longer. This consistency suggests that the gender diﬀerences for
competition we measure are stable with repetition.
Figure 3 shows the eﬀect of the relative performance feedback that occurs between Treatments
4 and 5 on choices. The two groups of bars on the left side of the figure suggest that females’
choices are barely aﬀected by this information. Comparing females and males before feedback,
we see that females select both group pay and piece rate much more frequently than males. This
replicates earlier findings, and shows that gender diﬀerences for competitive choices are robust to
the addition of a group pay option and diﬀerent sized tournaments.
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Figure 2: Choice Diﬀerences Before Feedback, by Gender and Session
Sample size in parentheses.
The right side of Figure 3 shows that male’s choices are dramatically aﬀected by information
about the performance of potential competitors. There is a significant increase in the proportion
of males choosing piece rate (5% significance level) and group pay (10% significance level), and a
significant decrease in the proportion choosing tournaments (5% significance level). After receiving
the relative performance information (Relative Info), the choices of men and women become more
similar. Comparing the distributions of men’s and women’s choices in Treatment 4 gives a Pearson
chi-square statistic of 18.79 (p-value: 0.000). With relative performance feedback, in Treatment
5, the chi-square statistic across genders is 1.91 (p-value: 0.385) and the proportions of males and
females choosing tournaments are not statistically diﬀerent from each other.
With information, on average men become less competitive while women’s choices seem to
barely change. However, there is significant movement within both genders based on ability. These
within-subject responses to feedback, by gender and ability, are discussed in a later section.
While there are no significant diﬀerences in performance between males and females, other
factors such as age and GPA might aﬀect compensation choices. We use an ordered probit
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Figure 3: Selection Diﬀerences by Gender and Information Treatment (Treatments 4 and 5)
Females (172), Males (173). Sample size in parentheses.
estimation model to test whether the gender diﬀerences in the probability of selections for Treatment
4 remain after controlling for these other potentially relevant factors. We show that the gender
diﬀerences persist with these controls, along with the addition of control variables for confidence,
performance, and improvement in the repetition of tasks in a tournament.
Table 4 shows the results from ordered probit estimations of choices in Treatment 4. Columns
1 to 3 use CompScale as the dependent ordinal variable, where group pay compensation is less
competitive than piece rate which is less competitive than a tournament of any size.7
Table 4 replicates the results of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) with Treatment 4, before
relative performance feedback. Females are less likely than males to enter tournaments, even when
controlling for individual confidence (Confidence (T1)) and relative rank of performance within the
session (%-tile Rank (T1)) from the first treatment. The %-tile Rank (T1) variable gives the rank of
an individual based on her or his performance in Treatment 1 in the session. Using rank allows us to
7Our results are consistent with those from multinomial logit and from using ordered probit with rankings that
treat larger tournaments as more competitive.
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Table 4: Ordered Probit Estimates: Choices for No Relative Information Treatment
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled RE RE Risk
VARIABLES CompScale CompScale CompScale
Female -0.36 -0.40 -0.49
(0.13) (0.15) (0.19)
(***) (***) (**)
Confidence (T1) 0.86 0.98 0.99
(0.25) (0.29) (0.34)
(***) (***) (***)
Improve (T2) 0.61 0.72 0.73
(0.20) (0.23) (0.32)
(***) (***) (**)
%-tile Rank (T1) 1.05 1.08 0.85
(0.23) (0.26) (0.32)
(***) (***) (***)
Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Risk Controls No No Yes
Observations 343 343 224
ll -336.6 -335.6 -212.3
chi2 66.91 61.00 48.81
Pooled means pooled cross section. RE means that random eﬀects were used.
Standard errors in parentheses. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
have the same measure for both math and word tasks.8 Confidence is measured by an individual’s
predicted performance at the end of Treatment 1 (prior to finding out their actual performance)
divided by that individual’s prediction of the average performance of all session participants.9 To
control for performance, we use the relative rank from Treatment 1, but the results are unchanged
when using absolute performance along with an interaction term for word based tasks.
As expected, both confidence and the percentile rank from the first treatment are positively
correlated with the selection of more competitive environments. Improvement in task performance
between the first and second task (Improve (T2)) also has a significant positive eﬀect. These
regressions include controls for individual specific characteristics, including the number of years of
college, psychoactive medication, GPA, and age.10 The results are similar when using a random
eﬀects ordered probit, in column 2. Column 3 includes a measure of risk aversion for individuals
8Using a variable that measures actual performance with an interaction term for the type of task, gives the same
results as are presented here.
9Females tend to be less confident than males in the math task, but females and males have no significant diﬀerences
in confidence in the word task and selection diﬀerences still remain.
10Details on these controls are in the appendix.
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that participated in a task similar to the one used by Holt and Laury (2003). We find that this
measure of risk aversion is not significantly correlated with competitive choices in Treatment 4.
The marginal eﬀects (calculated from column 1) show that a female has a 0.14 lower probability
of choosing a tournament than a male, even when controlling for performance and confidence. For
a female to be as likely to choose a tournament as an average male, we would have to increase
her belief about her performance relative to the average by 40%, which is a significant increase in
overconfidence. A ten-percentile improvement in actual relative performance would increase the
probability of entering a tournament by 0.04. A female would have to improve her percentile rank
by 34% to be as likely to enter a tournament as a male. Thus, these gender diﬀerences are not just
significant, but they are also large.
After each treatment, before receiving any feedback, subjects were asked how many correct
answers they believed they submitted. Subjects were paid ($0.25) for each correct answer to
encourage accurate answers. We create a measure of confidence by dividing an individual’s prediction
of how well he or she did divided by his or her prediction of the session average for that treatment.
Since the average individual should believe they did not perform any better than the session average,
this confidence measure should have a mean of one– in the absence of overconfidence.11 We could
have asked for rank estimates instead of performance estimates, but rank is a poor measure of the
degree of over or under confidence. Consider two individuals that think they are ranked first in
their respective group. One may think that he is 10% better than the average while the other
may think she is 50% better. Both these individuals would be treated as having the same level of
confidence with the rank measure, but one individual is actually much more confident. We use the
measure of confidence from the first treatment because every subject performed the task for this
treatment under the same piece rate form of compensation. This confidence measure also provides
the earliest measure of overconfidence before experiencing any feedback or diﬀering experimental
manipulations.
Of course, changes in performance as the experiment proceeds could change confidence. The
variable Improve (T2), measured as the ratio of the individual’s performance from Treatment 2
divided by the performance in Treatment, captures the eﬀect of individual improvement between
11We also asked how many correct answers they believed were submitted by the most productive person, the least
productive person, as well as the average number of correct answers, for each session and treatment. We use the
average instead of the prediction of the best or worst individual in the session because it provides a clean measure of
overconfidence. In other estimations, not included here, these measures were separated and variations of using both
the best performance and the worst performance as the denominator were used with little diﬀerence in our results.
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Treatment 1 (piece rate) and Treatment 2 (tournament). There are two possible reasons that
this variable should matter: First, individuals may feel that they improve more than the average
individual or that they were unlucky in Treatment 1 compared to how others would have performed.
Second, it may be the case that individuals become more motivated to put in greater eﬀort because
of the competitive nature of the tournament in Treatment 2. Individuals that improve a lot from
competing in such settings would be more likely to choose to compete than individuals whose
performances are not positively aﬀected by competitive settings.
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) found that part of the diﬀerence between male and female
willingness to compete was driven by males being more overconfident than females. In their study,
independent of confidence, females had a 0.16 lower probability of entering a tournament than males.
Using our measure of confidence we find that the gender diﬀerence is nearly the same, 0.14. Our
Figure 4: Selection Diﬀerences for Females by Task Type for No Information Treatment
within-subjects design includes one session of math treatments and one of word treatments. Gu¨nther
et al. (2010) found that in a maze task, men increased performance in reaction to competitive
pressures by more than women did. In a word task the improvements were the same. They attribute
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this to a ”stereotype threat” arising from beliefs that women are not good at the maze task. This
could logically lead to diﬀerent choices by women to compete, with diﬀerent tasks. Figure 4 shows
that in our data there is little diﬀerence in the selection of competitive environments by females
regardless of the type of task used. We also find little diﬀerence in choices by males as more than
50% of males chose to compete in tournaments in both math and word tasks.
There still may be gender diﬀerences in confidence across tasks that do not show up in choice
diﬀerences. Comparing females and males, in Table 5, we find both genders are overconfident
on average, but the degree of this overconfidence varies by task. Males are significantly more
overconfident in their math abilities than females. But there is no significant diﬀerence in confidence
between males and females in the word task. There is also no significant diﬀerence among females
between the math and word tasks, though males seem significantly more confident in their math
abilities than in their abilities in performing the word task.
Table 5: Confidence Diﬀerences by Gender and Task Type
Task Type Gender Confidence (T1) S.E.
Math Female 1.081 0.030
Math Male 1.209 0.037
Math Both 1.145 0.024
Word Female 1.046 0.029
Word Male 1.039 0.030
Word Both 1.043 0.021
Both Female 1.064 0.021
Both Male 1.128 0.025
Both Both 1.096 0.016
When comparing aggregated confidence for Both,
removing an outlier makes the gender diﬀerence insignificant at 5%.
On average, males are slightly more confident in their abilities than females, but this is partly
driven by a few high ability and overconfident males, who are correct in believing they are better
than the average, but overestimate the degree. For example, the highest level of confidence for a
male is 3.375 times his prediction of the average. His actual performance is 2.29 times the actual
session average. Overall, males and females are fairly consistent in their choices to compete in
both types of task: males choose to compete more than females in both math and word tasks even
though male overconfidence is higher in the math task. The type of task was not significant in
regressions for choices, with or without confidence controls.
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2.3 Does Relative Performance Feedback Eliminate Gender Diﬀerences in Choices
to Compete?
If the gender diﬀerences in competitive choices that have been identified are driven by preference
diﬀerences for competition, then providing information about the quality of possible competitors
might reduce mistakes in competitive choices, but there is no obvious reason feedback should reduce
the gender diﬀerence if it is driven by preferences. We test the eﬀect of performance feedback on
choices by providing subjects with a list of the performance of all the participants in their session
from Treatment 1, before they choose their Treatment 5 compensation scheme. This provides
information about the quality of the competitors that participants may end up competing against,
if they choose to enter a tournament.
Table 6 shows the results from three diﬀerent types of ordered probits for Treatment 5 choices,
using the same CompScale dependent variable definition as in the Treatment 4 analysis. Columns
1 through 3 show, that once performance feedback is provided, there are no significant diﬀerences
between males and females in choices. Instead, we find that choices are very dependent on
the relative performance information and on the individual’s improvement from Treatment 1 to
Treatment 2. Risk aversion control variables are not significantly correlated with compensation
choices on average; though risk aversion measures were significant when only examining high ability
individuals’ choices in Treatment 5. The one variable that consistently aﬀects individual choices in
Treatment 5 is an individual’s percentile rank from Treatment 1, which is a summary statistic of
the feedback information provided to individuals prior to making a competitive choice.
The overall conclusion from Table 6 is that there are no significant diﬀerences between females’
and males’ selections of competitive environments when they are fully informed of their relative
performance compared to potential competitors. In the next section we consider the costs of the
selection diﬀerences between men and women when they lack information about the quality of
competitors and whether there are gender diﬀerences according to ability levels.
2.4 The Cost of Gender Diﬀerences in Compensation Choice.
To give some sense of the costs of gender diﬀerences in choices, we simplify and assume people
maximize expected payoﬀs, keep eﬀort constant across compensation choices, and take the choices
and performance of others as given. Table 7 shows the average expected value losses for the
21
Table 6: Ordered Probit Estimates: Choices for Relative Information Treatment
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled RE RE Risk
VARIABLES CompScale CompScale CompScale
Female 0.00 -0.02 0.13
(0.13) (0.18) (0.21)
() () ()
Confidence (T1) 0.34 0.44 0.65
(0.24) (0.30) (0.35)
() () (*)
Improve (T2) 0.81 1.01 0.65
(0.20) (0.26) (0.32)
(***) (***) (**)
%-tile Rank (T1) 2.17 2.59 2.31
(0.25) (0.34) (0.37)
(***) (***) (***)
Risk Controls No No Yes
Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 343 343 224
ll -320.6 -316.7 -194.5
chi2 110.9 98.51 79.67
Pooled means pooled cross section. RE means that random eﬀects were used
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
suboptimal selections by males and females in Treatment 4 and Treatment 5.12 Each column
represents the optimal choice that should have been made. The numbers represent the average
expected value cost for choosing something other than that optimal choice. For example, in the
first row under column 6 (for the 6 person sized tournament), the 27.27 represents the average loss
to females whose optimal choice would have been a tournament of six, but who instead chose a
diﬀerent form of compensation. The Avg Loss column provides the average loss by gender and
treatment. The average loss of 6.78 in the first row means that females lost an average of $6.78
from their suboptimal choices in Treatment 4.
In Treatment 4, the average expected value loss from selection mistakes was $4.91 for males
and $6.78 for females, a statistically insignificant diﬀerence with a t-test. These loss diﬀerences
are mostly driven by high ability females choosing not to compete, and to a lesser extent by low
ability males choosing to compete. Column 6 shows that many high ability females (those who
should select a tournament size of 6) are instead selecting smaller tournaments or group pay or
12The method used to calculate expected values is provided in the Appendix.
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Table 7: Selection Losses
Average Loss from Suboptimal Decisions
Optimal Choice
Treatment Gender Grp PR 2 4 6 Avg Loss
4 Female Avg Loss 1.58 2.28 2.91 6.80 27.27 6.78
4 Male Avg Loss 2.42 2.97 2.31 3.29 12.60 4.91
5 Female Avg Loss 0.88 1.88 2.21 5.93 18.70 4.80
5 Male Avg Loss 1.39 1.49 2.02 4.79 10.98 3.95
piece rate, at a large cost. The top females lose $27.27 in expected value compared to $12.60 for the
top males. In contrast, low ability males make only slightly more costly decisions than low ability
females, averaging $2.42 versus $1.58 for the lowest types of each gender. We find that high ability
females and high ability males are not entering competitive environments enough. But the high
ability females overwhelming select the noncompetitive environments of piece rate and group pay,
which are very costly decisions. In contrast, too many low ability males are entering competitive
environments, but these mistakes are not particularly costly, on average, because low ability males
would not perform well in the piece rate either.
Table 7 also shows that relative performance feedback decreases the average expected value
losses for both males and females and shrinks the gender gap as well. The decreases in expected
value losses are greatest for high ability females, whose average expected loss fell from $27.27 in
Treatment 4 to $18.70 in Treatment 5, while losses for high ability males fell from $12.60 to $10.98.
Low ability females and males tend to move towards group pay as they get performance feedback.
While a gender diﬀerence remains, with low ability males making more expensive mistakes than
women, the cost diﬀerences are small.
In Figure 5, we turn to the question of how relative choice information aﬀects the choices of
high ability females and males. A high ability individual is defined as an individual who should
enter a four person tournament or larger to maximize expected returns from competition. Figure
5 shows that the relative performance information leads to a large increase in the proportion of
high ability females entering tournaments. Over 50% of high ability females enter tournaments
when given relative performance feedback, which is significantly more than the 31% that choose
tournaments before receiving the performance feedback. In testing for distributional changes, we
find that there is a significant diﬀerence in choices for females between Treatment 4 and Treatment
5; using a Pearson chi-square test the level of significance is p = 0.034.
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Figure 5: Information Eﬀects for Decisions by High Ability Types
Females (45), Males (50). Sample size in parentheses.
With information, fewer high ability males enter tournaments (12% less), but this change in
tournament selection is not statistically significant (at a 5% significance level). The distributional
diﬀerence of choices for high ability males coming from information feedback is not significant as a
chi-square test comparing high ability males between treatments produces a level of significance of
p = 0.317. Without feedback in Treatment 4, there is a significant diﬀerence in the distributions of
competitive choices between males and females (p = 0.000). After receiving feedback as the level of
significance using a chi2 test is p = 0.158. Thus, relative performance feedback seems to eliminate
most of the diﬀerences in choices between the high ability females and high ability males.
Figure 6 shows the eﬀect of relative performance information on choices by low ability types,
where low ability is defined as those individuals with performance below the median in their
respective session from Treatment 1. The largest eﬀects are for males. Information drops the
percentage of low ability males choosing tournaments from 43% to 22%, and increases the percentage
of low ability males choosing group pay from 37% to 51%. For low ability males, the diﬀerence
in the distribution of competitive choices between Treatment 4 and Treatment 5 is significant at a
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Figure 6: Information Eﬀects for Decisions by Low Ability Types
Females (99), Males (90). Sample size in parentheses.
p = 0.010 with a chi-square test. No such significant diﬀerence occurs for low ability females. The
distributions of choices are significantly diﬀerent for low ability females and males in Treatment
4 as chi-square test lead to a p = 0.054. But in Treatment 5 there are no significant diﬀerences
between distributions for low ability females and males.
Information about relative performance moves high ability females towards more competitive
choices and low ability males away from tournaments towards less competitive types of pay. Low
ability females show only a small movement away from group pay towards piece rate. Overall,
providing relative performance feedback information leads to more eﬃcient sorting by both genders.
2.5 Competitiveness of Females Diﬀers Between Low and High Hormone Phases
Normal cycling women experience large changes in hormone levels across the menstrual cycle.
Hormonal contraceptives deliver hormones exogenously, suppressing the endogenous production of
hormones that occurs across the natural cycle. Both groups of females experience a low hormone
phase, during menses for normal cycling females and during the placebo (non-use) phase for females
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using hormonal contraceptives. We look for diﬀerences in competitive behavior across these phases.
This section starts with an explanation of how we determined the hormonal phase for the females
subjects. We then show the diﬀerences in choices across phases.
We used a screening survey with retrospective questions on menses to schedule participants for
a session during both a low-hormone phase and a high-hormone phase. The high-hormone phase
of interest corresponds to the mid-luteal peak for normal cycling females (Figure 1). Females
using hormonal contraceptives experience elevated exogenous hormones about three days into
contraceptive use.
Table 8: Menstrual Cycle Regularity
Regularity of Period Percent Count
Identical 14.3% 55
Within 1-2 days 42.3% 163
Within 3-7 days 34.3% 132
Very Irregular (7+) 9.1% 35
Total 385
Missed Period in Last 3 Months Percent Count
Yes 14.7% 57
No 85.3% 330
Total 387
Numbers may not add up due to item non-response in screening survey.
Table 8 summarizes screening survey responses of females. Of the females who completed the
screening survey almost 15% missed a menstrual period during the previous 3 months. Over 43% of
these females experienced menstrual cycle irregularity of 3 days or more, suggesting that predicted
menstrual periods may have significant measurement error. Due to the potential inaccuracies
introduced by this prospective survey, we used an exit survey with both retrospective and prospective
questions on the cycle, to help with the identification of hormonal phases.13
The screening survey also provided information on the proportion of females that use hormonal
contraceptives. Over 54% of females in our sample used some form of hormonal contraceptive in
the form of the pill or ring. This makes for easier predictability of low and high phases for these
females, since hormonal fluctuations are exogenously determined by hormonal contraceptive use.
To help identify hormonal phases for females using a hormonal contraceptive, we asked all female
participants for the start day of their hormonal contraceptive regimen.
13Missed periods are a problem for identification purposes in normal cycling females as they imply that a female
may not have ovulated during that month, and thus did not experience a mid-luteal peak in hormones. Furthermore,
without a recent menstrual period it is diﬃcult to determine the phase in the hormonal cycle.
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Of the females that participated in experiment sessions, 62.7% of those attending a first session
were following a hormonal contraceptive regimen, as were 62.9% of those at second sessions. The
American College Health Association found that about 72% of sexually active females were using
some form of hormonal contraceptive in 2008 . In examining contraceptive use by females in the
United States, it was found that for women between the ages of 15 to 44, over 82% had at one
time taken oral hormonal contraceptives (Mosher et al. 2004), suggesting that our sample is not
unusual in terms of contraceptive use.
Females during the placebo phase of the hormonal contraceptive regimen experience lower levels
of estrogen and progesterone than during the active phase of their hormonal contraceptive regimen;
this is due to the lack of exogenous hormones being provided (Speroﬀ and Fritz 2005). Females
with a naturally occurring menstrual cycle experience a drop in hormones during menses (Aden et
al. 1998). We hypothesize that the low hormone phase, whether induced through endogenous or
exogenous means, is associated with similar behavioral changes for both hormonal contraceptive
users and normal cycling females. We tested this by including a control variable for hormonal
contraceptive use and found no systematic significant diﬀerence in behavior between hormonal
contraceptive users and normal cycling females. We therefore pool both groups of females and
focus on diﬀerences across phases.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of competitive choices of females by phase, along with choices
by males, before participants had relative performance feedback. Female behavior is very diﬀerent
in the two phases. They are more than twice as likely to choose group pay when they are in the
low phase, and twice as likely to choose tournament when they are in the high phase, though still
not as likely as men. When we include controls in regressions, this last diﬀerence will become
insignificant. The data for the histogram includes all females and males that attended two sessions
and all females who could be identified as being in the low or the high phase. Due to the diﬃculty
of predicting the low phase, some females were identified by the exit survey as being in the same
phase for both word and math tasks. As well, some phases could not be accurately identified and
those subjects are not included in the analyses.
These diﬀerences in competitive environment choices across hormonal phases may result from
diﬀerences in expected performance changes across the menstrual cycle or from diﬀerent preferences
for competition. We find that for the most part, there are no significant performance diﬀerences
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Figure 7: Competitive Choice by Gender and Hormonal Phase
between females in the low phase and those that are not in the low phase.14 It is also possible
that females in a specific hormonal phase might experience greater aversion to certain types of
tasks; therefore, we separate out these results by math and word tasks. Figure 8 shows female
compensation choices before feedback by hormonal phase and task type. Recall that we alternated
the type of task used in sessions; females that participated in a math or word task during the low
phase would then participate in the other type of task when in a higher hormonal phase (High
Phase), and vice-versa, therefore these are averages across subjects. The figure shows that the
general correlation between competitive choice and menstrual phase holds: high phase females are
less likely to choose group pay and more likely to choose tournaments in both word and math tasks.
Next we use ordered probits to examine the statistical significance of gender and menstrual
phase before feedback, while including control variables. Table 9 uses the CompScale variable,
an ordered categorical variable with choices ranked from group pay, piece rate, to tournament.
The first column provides pooled cross-sectional results including all subjects, the second to fourth
14See Appendix B.1.
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Figure 8: Compensation Choice by Hormonal Phase and Task Type for Females.
We are comparing females that attended two sessions.
Sample size in parentheses.
columns provide estimates using random eﬀects ordered probit. The second column includes all
males and females, the third column consists of a female only sample and the fourth column takes
into account only males and females for which risk aversion measures were available.15
We find that females in the low phase select less competitive compensation plans than females in
the high hormone phase. Without relative performance information, much of the diﬀerence between
genders is driven by choices of the low phase females. This result holds even when controlling for
confidence levels of individuals. It is worth noting that there are no significant diﬀerences in
confidence levels between low hormonal phase and high hormonal phase females and yet females
in the low phase avoid the competitive environments of tournaments and are more likely to choose
the least competitive setting possible, group pay.
These diﬀerences could potentially result from discomfort during the low hormone phase of
menstruation. But females in the low hormone phase do not behave diﬀerently from any other
group once they receive relative performance feedback. Thus, physical discomfort is an unlikely
15All regressions include controls for session ordering, GPA, age, education, and psychoactive medications.
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Table 9: Ordered Probit: Hormone Eﬀects for No Relative Information (Treatment 4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All All Females Only Risk
VARIABLES Pooled RE RE RE
Female -0.26 -0.29 -0.26
(0.14) (0.16) (0.21)
(*) (*) ()
Low Phase -0.44 -0.46 -0.53 -0.76
(0.21) (0.22) (0.26) (0.27)
(**) (**) (**) (***)
Confidence (T1) 0.81 0.91 1.08 0.90
(0.26) (0.30) (0.54) (0.35)
(***) (***) (**) (**)
Improve (T2) 0.60 0.69 0.79 0.72
(0.20) (0.23) (0.38) (0.32)
(***) (***) (**) (**)
%-tile Rank (T1) 0.97 0.99 0.52 0.72
(0.23) (0.26) (0.43) (0.32)
(***) (***) () (**)
Risk Controls No No No Yes
Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 328 328 155 211
ll -322.3 -321.7 -156.0 -197.4
chi2 64.32 58.60 19.76 51.31
Dependent variable is CompScale where -1 is group pay, 0 is piece rate, and 1 is a tournament.
The total low phase females that could be identified for data analysis is 45.
Pooled means pooled cross section. RE means that random eﬀects were used.
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
explanation for these systematic diﬀerences in low information settings.
The magnitudes of the marginal eﬀects (calculated using the pooled cross sectional estimates)
of being in the low hormone phase are substantial and are larger than the average gender eﬀects.
For group pay, females on average have a 0.08 higher probability of choosing group pay than males.
Females in the low phase have an additional 0.16 higher probability of choosing group pay. For
tournaments, females have a 0.10 lower probability of choosing a tournament when compared to
males, and females in the low hormone phase have an additional 0.16 decrease in the probability
of choosing a tournament.
These hormonal eﬀects can also be compared to confidence and performance. For a female
in the low phase to have the same probability of entering a tournament as a female in the high
phase, we would have to increase her belief about her performance relative to the average by 50%.
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In terms of an equivalent performance eﬀect, a female in the low hormone phase would have to
improve her percentile rank by 42% to be as likely to enter a tournament as a female in the high
hormone phase. These diﬀerences across the menstrual cycle are not just significant, they are also
large relative to other eﬀects.
Relative performance feedback makes these cycle specific eﬀects disappear. Table 10 provides
the results from ordered probit estimations for Treatment 5, where subjects were provided with
relative performance information from Treatment 1 prior to making their competitive environment
selections. Table 10 shows that when participants are informed of their relative performance
compared to other potential competitors, then there is little diﬀerence in selection between genders
or across the menstrual cycle.
As with the gender diﬀerences, we find that after participants are informed of the quality of
potential competitors choice diﬀerences across the menstrual cycle become insignificant. We find
that choices with feedback mainly depend on the relative performance information provided prior to
making the decision and, to a certain extent, on an individual’s improvement from Treatment 1 to
Treatment 2. Though females’ choices to select less competitive environments are most frequent in
the low hormone phase, these results suggest that this eﬀect seems to be linked with the information
available about the quality of potential competitors.
As discussed previously, there is a cost associated with high ability individuals avoiding competitive
settings, and with low ability individuals choosing tournaments. We find that females in the low
hormone phase make more costly mistakes than high phase females, and males.16 The average
expected value losses for males, low phase and high phase females in Treatment 4 are shown in Table
11. Low phase females sacrifice the greatest amount of expected value from making suboptimal
choices, $8.50. The expected value losses for high phase females and males are $6.52 and $4.91.
The diﬀerences between low and high phase females and between males and high phase females are
not statistically significant, but low phase females make more costly choices than males at the 5%
significance level.
These results imply that hormones may matter in the selection of competitive environments,
but only if the strength of the competition or the probability of winning is relatively unknown. If
there is little information, then females in the low-hormone phase make more costly decisions than
males and non-low phase females. But there are no significant diﬀerences in expected value losses
16These expected values are calculated in the same way as discussed in the previous section.
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Table 10: Ordered Probit: Hormone Eﬀects after Feedback (Treatment 5)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All All Females Only Risk
VARIABLES Pooled RE RE RE
Female -0.07 -0.13 0.10
(0.15) (0.20) (0.24)
() () ()
Low Phase 0.03 0.13 0.12 -0.12
(0.21) (0.25) (0.27) (0.29)
() () () ()
Confidence (T1) 0.23 0.32 0.21 0.54
(0.25) (0.31) (0.53) (0.36)
() () () ()
Improve (T2) 0.76 0.92 1.06 0.49
(0.20) (0.26) (0.40) (0.33)
(***) (***) (***) ()
%-tile Rank (T1) 2.18 2.61 2.63 2.33
(0.25) (0.35) (0.55) (0.38)
(***) (***) (***) (***)
Risk Controls No No No Yes
Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 328 328 155 211
ll -307.8 -303.9 -143.3 -183.4
chi2 104.7 93.82 45.89 75.79
We identified 45 females as low phase for this analysis.
Pooled is pooled cross section, RE is random eﬀects.
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
between genders or between diﬀerent hormonal phases for females if good relative performance
information is available.
2.6 Systematic Absenteeism, Cancellations, and Tardiness
Absenteeism, cancellations, and tardiness are frequent in experiments, but their eﬀect on sample
composition and results are poorly understood. In this study, because of the screening and exit
surveys, we know some of the characteristics of those who missed a scheduled session, canceled
at the last moment, or showed up late. Our recruiting procedures were designed to ensure we
would observe females during both the high phase and the shorter low hormone phase. Due to
the variation of the menstrual cycle, it is diﬃcult to predict the low hormonal phase for females.
Using the screening survey, female subjects were scheduled for their sessions according to their
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Table 11: Expected Value Loss in Treatment 4
Mean Std. Error
Male 4.91 0.72
Female Non-Low 6.52 1.30
Female Low 8.50 2.57
predicted cycle day, calculated using self reported data about the start of previous menstrual
periods. Whenever possible these data were combined with self reported data concerning females’
hormonal contraceptive regimens. Once the cycle day could be predicted, then a set of possible
session days were provided to potential participants and they chose and confirmed a day with a
research assistant. For individuals to be considered as scheduled, they had to confirm that they
would attend a specific session.
Table 12: Session Attendance After Confirmation
Gender
Proportion N
Male 0.79 217
Female 0.68 243
Total 0.73 460
Females by Predicted Phase
Proportion N
High 0.72 141
Low 0.62 102
Total 0.68 246
Table 12 shows the proportion of participants that attended the experiment sessions as scheduled,
meaning they were present and punctual. Females are noticeably less likely to show up than males:
79% of the males showed up as scheduled compared to 68% of females. Based on predicted phases,
only 62% of low phase females attended as scheduled, while high phase females attended 72% of
the time. These diﬀerences between attendance rates of low phase and non-low phase females were
significant at the 5% level. High phase females were less likely to attend compared to males, but this
was significant only at the 10% level. Since this study was partly focused on hormonal fluctuations
we made attempts to incentivize more low phase females to attend. Part way through the study,
the participation payment of $5 was raised to $10 for low phase females.17 Even with this increase
in participation payments a hormonal phase related diﬀerence in attendance remained. This result
is consistent with Ichino and Moretti (2009), who found that female worker absenteeism was highly
17These females were not told why they were receiving a higher participation payment.
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correlated with the female menstrual cycle.
These attendance results suggest there may be a systematic bias in the hormonal phase of
females who show up to experiments. Coupled with our evidence of behavioral diﬀerences, this
bias should be considered in interpreting the results of experiments that report gender diﬀerences.
Additionally, if females who do not show up to sessions are the ones who have worse symptoms
during the low phase, or are more likely to behave diﬀerently, then a selection bias may add a
downward bias in the hormonal eﬀects found in this study. Though one should still note that any
such diﬀerences are removed with relative performance feedback.
2.7 Confidence and Robustness
It is possible that during the low hormone phase females are not as confident in their abilities as
during elevated hormonal phases. Here we show that confidence diﬀerences do not explain the choice
diﬀerences across phases. Table 13 shows that there are no significant diﬀerences in confidence for
females across phases. There are also no significant diﬀerences between females using or not using
hormonal contraceptives. Thus, diﬀerences in confidence do not seem to explain why females in
the low hormonal phase choose not to compete without relative performance feedback.
Table 13: Confidence Levels of Females by Hormonal Phase
Confidence (T1)
Phase Task Mean Std. Error N
High Math 1.068 0.032 58
Low Math 1.041 0.078 23
Both Math 1.060 0.031 81
High Word 1.021 0.031 54
Low Word 1.042 0.057 22
Both Word 1.027 0.028 76
The sample consists of all females
whose phase could be accurately identified.
2.8 Robustness Checks
We conducted a variety of robustness checks. First, we checked to see whether the results for gender
diﬀerences in competition and diﬀerences by hormonal phase remain consistent when clustering
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standard errors on experiment sessions and then also separately on individuals. We found that the
results of both the gender and hormonal eﬀects are robust to such error clustering.18
Individuals in this study were asked to attend two sessions. Out of 219 total subjects, 126
attended two sessions and 93 attended only a single session. Session composition was random,
sessions contained individuals that were attending sessions for either a first or a second time. The
type of task individuals were using to compete was diﬀerent for the first and second session, and
the ordering was random. Neither order, the type of task, or group composition in terms of these
measures had significant performance or behavioral eﬀects.
The possibility exists that attendance in the second session was aﬀected by how much subjects
earned in the first session. Individuals that attended only a single session earned $9.36 for their
performance, while individuals that returned for a second session were paid $11.73 for their first
session performance. This diﬀerence in payouts between these groups of individuals is not statistically
significant.
Another possibility is that the value of payment in the first session aﬀects confidence in the
second session. We exploit the random element in the payment scheme and estimate that, controlling
for performance, a person who earns $10 more than average in the first session increases their
prediction of their performance relative to the session average by just 4%. Looking just at th
second session females, we find that their confidence in the second session is more sensitive to how
much they got paid in the first session than is that of males. But we find no significant diﬀerence
between females’ and males’ confidence when attending a second session, or across menstrual cycle
phase. Any such diﬀerence should in fact make females more competitive in second sessions, but
we find no systematic behavior in this direction.
It is still possible that there is an interaction between payments and gender driving choice
diﬀerences. Table 14 provides ordered probit estimations to examine whether females are still less
likely to compete when controlling for payments in the first session. Though the first session payout
variable is significant at the 10% level, its inclusion does not aﬀect the significance of the gender
diﬀerence of females to avoid competition.
Results seem consistent for both the sample where risk aversion measures were available and
for the sample of participants that did not participate in the risk aversion task. The third column
in Table 14 provides the coeﬃcients from the ordered probit estimation for the full information
18Results are available upon request.
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Table 14: Robustness Check for Gender: Controlling for First Session Payment
(1) (2) (3)
RE RE & Risk RE & Full Info (T5)
VARIABLES CompScale CompScale CompScale
Female -0.40 -0.50 -0.02
(0.156) (0.201) (0.178)
*** **
Confidence (T1) 1.00 1.01 0.53
(0.301) (0.361) (0.309)
*** *** *
Improve (T2) 0.78 0.81 1.10
(0.245) (0.333) (0.276)
*** ** ***
%-tile Rank (T1) 1.08 0.82 2.56
(0.264) (0.333) (0.345)
*** ** ***
First Session Payout 0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
* *
Risk Controls No Yes No
Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 343 224 343
chi2 65.63 52.89 100.7
ll -333.3 -210.2 -315.6
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
treatment (Treatment 5). Again, with feedback we find that gender does not matter in this setting
and neither does the payout from the first session. Thus it seems that the gender diﬀerence for
competition in low information settings is not aﬀected by the payment received in a previous session.
We now use similar estimations to test whether the hormone specific results are sensitive to the
inclusion of a payment variable. We find no significant diﬀerences in confidence or payouts in the
first session between females who could be identified as low phase and the females that were in a
second session and were in the high hormone phase. The first column of 15 provides ordered probit
coeﬃcients for the entire sample of individuals, including both those that attended a single session
and those that attended two sessions. In this sample, we find that the first session payout variable
is significant at the 10% level, but the eﬀect is quite small. The eﬀect of females being in the low
hormonal phase remains large and significant at the 5% level.
In the second column in Table 15 we limit the sample to those individuals who participated in
the risk aversion task and therefore attended two sessions. In this sample, while controlling for risk
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Table 15: Robustness Check for Hormones: Controlling for First Session Payment
(1) (2)
RE RE & Risk
VARIABLES CompScale CompScale
Female -0.29 -0.27
(0.167) (0.212)
*
Low Phase -0.44 -0.74
(0.224) (0.275)
** ***
Confidence (T1) 0.95 0.94
(0.306) (0.366)
*** **
Improve (T2) 0.74 0.77
(0.245) (0.328)
*** **
%-tile Rank (T1) 0.98 0.68
(0.261) (0.329)
*** **
First Session Payout 0.02 0.01
(0.009) (0.009)
*
Risk Controls No Yes
Characteristic Controls Yes Yes
Observations 328 211
chi2 62.07 53.99
ll -320.0 -196.0
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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aversion, we find that the eﬀect of the low hormonal phase is large and significant, but that the
level of the payout from the first session is insignificant. As well, in this group of individuals who
did the risk aversion task, we find that the gender eﬀect is insignificant, but that the eﬀect of the
low phase for females remains significant.
Thus, these checks of the eﬀects of first session payouts on second session attendance and
behavior show that some of the gender diﬀerence in competitive choices may be entirely driven
by females in the low hormone phase of their cycle. They further confirm that the gender and
menstrual phase diﬀerences are only relevant in low information settings. In the following section
we discuss the results and implications of our findings.
3 Discussion
We show that the gender diﬀerences in compensation choices that have been reported in other
studies are robust to a variety of protocol changes, including diﬀerent tasks and variations in the
degree of competitiveness of the available choices. These gender diﬀerences are stable, persisting
in a second session of the experiment with a diﬀerent task, performed days or weeks after the first
session. We also find that female choices in a mixed gender setting vary across the menstrual cycle.
In the low hormone phase, females are less likely to enter tournaments than during a a high hormone
phase. All these diﬀerences for competitive environment selections become noticeably smaller and
statistically insignificant after subjects are provided with feedback on their relative performance.
Previous studies have shown that gender diﬀerences in compensation choices remain even after
controlling for confidence and performance. The general conclusion has been that an underlying
gender diﬀerence in preferences for competition must be driving the result. But if the choice
diﬀerences originate from diﬀerent preferences for competitive environments, then selection diﬀerences
should remain even after relative performance feedback is provided, in our experiment they do not.
Further, we find gender diﬀerences in competitive choices in both math and word tasks. In the
word tasks, confidence levels of females and males are the same and a gender diﬀerence in choices
persists. In the math task the gender diﬀerence persists even after controlling for confidence.
The information about relative abilities may help subjects form more accurate beliefs about the
possibilities of succeeding in competitive situations, but since females hold similar overconfident
beliefs as males in word tasks, we would expect females to choose in a similar fashion as males.
38
Instead, females choose not to compete in low information settings, irrespective of confidence or
the type of task.
Another possible explanation for the diﬀerence in gender behavior with and without feedback
would be a gender diﬀerence in risk aversion or beliefs. However, we control for risk aversion and
beliefs about relative ability and find that the gender diﬀerence still remains, in the uninformed
treatment. Since beliefs are updated and become more accurate in the full information treatment,
we should find that risk aversion matters in such a setting, we do not find that result. Another
explanation that would be consistent with our results would be a gender diﬀerence in ambiguity
aversion rather than risk aversion. There is little support in the literature for a stable gender
diﬀerence in ambiguity.
Our finding of a variation in an important economic behavior across the menstrual cycle is
consistent with a large endocrinological literature showing the importance of hormonal variations
to behavioral diﬀerences within females. There are neurological reasons to expect such an eﬀect,
for example higher levels of hormones such as estrogen have been found to increase activation
areas of the brain that are related to anticipation of uncertain rewards. One other paper, Buser
(2010) looks at competition and the menstrual cycle. Using between subject diﬀerences in females
competing against other females, he finds that in the low hormone phase females compete more.
Other studies have found that female behavior in single gender groups is very diﬀerent from that
in mixed gender groups (Datta Gupta et al. 2005, Grosse and Reiner 2010)– females are generally
much more willing to compete when the group is all female.
We find that, in mixed gender groups, both the gender and hormone specific eﬀects that
both eﬀects are removed with information. In the mixed gender setting, relative performance
feedback leads more high ability females to compete and more low ability males to less competitive
settings. Thus, the gender composition of the particular labor market being examined may play an
important role in regards to the eﬀects of relative performance feedback and decisions to enter more
competitive settings by both males and females. Our within-subject design has obvious advantages
to an across subjects approach. The potential disadvantage would be that experiences in the first
session might aﬀect choices in the second. We use two diﬀerent tasks to minimize this problem, and
by showing the results are robust to order and these tasks, we provide additional evidence of the
strength of the eﬀect. Of course, as the gender composition eﬀects show, competitive entry is very
much context dependent, a result that is consistent with other findings in the neuroendocrinological
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literature (Anders and Watson 2006).
The existence of a regular and predictable within-subjects variation in behavior across the
menstrual cycle is a novel finding that raises many interesting questions for optimal choice. Women
who know that they are subject to this variation might well take steps to increase or decrease their
competitive choices by changing when they make decisions involving competition, such as job
choices and college applications. The fact that hormonal contraceptives allow for control of the
timing of the low hormone phase provides another potential control mechanism.
Interestingly, there is no medical reason for the low hormone (placebo) phase of the hormonal
contraceptive regimen (Anderson and Hait 2003). As a leading textbook on clinical gynecological
endocrinology states: Monthly bleeding, periodic bleeding, or no bleeding–this is an individual
woman’s choice (Speroﬀ and Fritz 2005, pg 908). It has been suggested that the placebo and
withdrawal bleeding was a marketing eﬀort to make the birth control pill seem less novel and more
acceptable(Coutinho and Segal 1999). In fact, females can entirely avoid hormonal fluctuations
and the low hormone phase by sustained contraceptive use. Indeed, some forms of contraception,
such as the oral contraceptive Seasonale, now eliminate the placebo and ensure that low hormone
phase does not occur (Anderson and Hait 2003). If the decrease in hormones aﬀects females in
a costly manner then there is an incentive for avoiding this phase. Women who are unaware of
the behavioral eﬀects of hormonal variations, or who are unable to commit to these timing or
contraceptive changes, might find themselves experiencing costly regret. Of course, our results also
show that such behaviors would only matter when there is poor information about ability relative
to potential competitors.
Firms, governments, and schools sometimes implement aﬃrmative action policies to encourage
females to apply for competitive jobs and scholarships. Aﬃrmative action policies typically focus
eﬀorts on recruiting females or changing the acceptance or promotion process to favor females.
Niederle et al. (2009) report on experiments showing aﬃrmative action can encourage competition
by females at low eﬃciency cost. The performance feedback condition result from our study suggests
an alternative to aﬃrmative action– providing better information about relative abilities.
We find that information settings play the greatest role in gender diﬀerences to compete. In
low information settings females, and more specifically, females in the low hormone phase chose to
be less competitive. This behavior was consistent in second iterations of the experiment sessions
by the same subjects. This was also consistent regardless of whether individuals were choosing
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to compete in a math or word task. In all these variations of the experimental setting, the eﬀect
of relative performance feedback removed any diﬀerences between the groups. This information
did more than just remove diﬀerences in confidence and the eﬀects of those diﬀerences. The fact
that both relative performance feedback and menstrual cycle variations aﬀect competitive choices
suggests that both information and biological factors contribute to gender diﬀerences in competitive
choice. Further investigation of these factors holds the promise for a better understanding of the
mechanisms behind these gender diﬀerences.
Prior to this study, three distinct methods were used to explain gender diﬀerences in competitive
choices. Gneezy et al. (2009) showed that gender eﬀect actually reversed in matrilineal societies.
Females have also been found to perform very diﬀerently in all female competitions (Gneezy et
al. 2003); suggesting that restricting the gender of potential competitors may also remove gender
diﬀerences in choices to compete. Aﬃrmative action policies have been shown to help remove
gender diﬀerences to compete with little eﬃciency cost (Niederle et al. 2009). We have shown
that the hormonal cycle of females partly explains gender diﬀerences for competition. But, if
individuals are given relative performance feedback prior to making competitive decisions, the
gender diﬀerence shrinks and becomes insignificant, and diﬀerences across the hormonal cycle for
women are also eliminated. Thus, this study has shown the importance of biological factors for the
gender diﬀerence in competitive choices, and has also shown that good information helps remove
the gender diﬀerence. These results are found using a within-subjects design and they hold over
multiple sessions and with both math and word tasks.
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A (Not For Publication) Appendix I: About controls
A number of control variables were used in this analysis including whether a subject was attending
a first or second session, or a word based session, neither were ever significant. Also, other
individual characteristic control variables such as the number of years of post secondary schooling,
age and GPA were included, but were never significant with the exception of number of years of
post secondary schooling, which was negative and significant. In estimations not included here
categorical dummy variables were included for the majors of students, but none were significant
and were removed due to their irrelevancy.
The other set of controls that are not listed are measures controlling for risk aversion. After
participating in both a math and word session, subjects were invited to participate in a Holt and
Laury (2002) task a few days after the competition experiment sessions. These risk aversion sessions
were done separately so as not to aﬀect behavior in the competition task. Consequently, the sample
of these individuals is slightly diﬀerent from the other specifications, but the results remain fairly
consistent. The risk aversion coeﬃcients were not found to be significant in the treatment with no
relative information feedback.19 The only specification where these measures are significant is in
the full information treatment for a limited sample of high ability individuals. The fact this measure
does not significantly predict behavior in the no information treatment is intuitive as individuals
have little information regarding their probabilities of success; thus, beliefs may matter more in
such situations than risk preferences. Since risk aversion is significant for high ability individuals
in the full information treatment; this result suggests that risk appetites matter only to individuals
that have higher returns from making an optimal choice. For those individuals of low ability, their
expected value is higher by avoiding the tournament regardless of risk preferences.20
Three variables that are used and presented in the tables include, Confidence (T1), Improve
(T2), %-tile Rank (T1). These variables deserve further explanation as they are measuring some
very relevant factors in the individual decision making process. In other estimations, variations of
these variables were used, but these variables provide the cleanest and most intuitive interpretation
possible and results remain consistent with other possible measures of the same factors.
19For brevity these results are not included in this discussion, but are available upon request.
20There were no significant gender diﬀerences for risk aversion in the sample.
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B (Not For Publication) Appendix II: Performance
The main focus of this paper is on the compensation choices that individuals made in the experiment;
however, these choices may have been aﬀected by performance diﬀerences. This section focuses on
task performance for the diﬀerent treatments. To consider how individuals are aﬀected by the
diﬀerent incentives of each type of compensation, we focus on the performance of individuals in
the first three treatments. In these first three treatments, individuals had no choice over the
type of compensation they received for their eﬀorts; thus, the performance eﬀects from diﬀerent
compensation environments are exogenously determined.
According to the theory of piece rates and tournaments, one would expect greater eﬀort for a
higher piece rate. Similarly, an individual of higher ability and higher probability of winning should
increase eﬀort in a tournament. As the tournament gets larger and more competitive, one would
expect that individuals would increase eﬀort or set their eﬀort levels to zero. Before considering the
eﬀects of tournament size on eﬀort, we first focus on possible order eﬀects and gender diﬀerences
between treatments.
The regressions in Table 16 are used to consider gender diﬀerences in performance, learning
eﬀects and the incentive eﬀects of increasing tournament size. The performance in the word task,
but not the math task, is highly correlated with the GPA of participants. Regression estimates for
both word and math show an order eﬀect suggesting that subjects are learning in the first three
treatments. Regression 1 in Table 16 shows that the tournament size has a statistically significant
positive eﬀect on individual performance in the math task. Increasing the competitiveness of a
compensation environment from the piece rate to a tournament size of 6 should increase performance
of an individual by 0.65 problems in a four-minute task. This is an increase of 5.7% for the average
individual. In columns 2, 4, and 5, categorical variables are used to investigate whether tournament
size is actually leading to the increase or whether just competing against someone in a tournament
of any size leads to performance increases.
In the second column in Table 16, categorical variables were used for each of the possible
competitive environments, for group pay and for tournaments. To test whether the tournament
size matters a separate dummy variable, Tourney (ts>1) was used to identify if an individual had
to compete against someone else. This categorization created a separate baseline for tournaments
consisting of six individuals. Once controlling for tournament competition it was found that the
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size of the tournament does not matter and that group pay performance is not significantly diﬀerent
from the piece rate environment in the math task. There is also a positive eﬀect for age as the
average eﬀect of a year of life leads to an increase in performance in the math task of 0.5 problems,
though this may be oﬀset by further post-secondary schooling. It is worth noting that overall
the competitive environment and individual characteristics explain very little of the variation in
performance for the math task in terms of goodness of fit measures such as R2.
The results from the word task (Regressions 3 and 4) in Table 16 suggest that neither the
tournament nor tournament size increase performance. There is a significant amount of learning
that occurs with each treatment. GPA has a significant positive eﬀect in terms of performance.
This likely occurs because an individual’s vocabulary expands with age and individuals with a
higher GPA probably have richer vocabularies than individuals with lower GPAs. More of the
variation in performance can be explained in regressions using the word task than the math task;
this mainly stems from the inclusion of control variables for the random letters used for each task.
The math task results suggest that being in a tournament does increase performance, but the size
of the tournament is irrelevant. One might expect that only high ability individuals would increase
performance from the incentive eﬀects from being in a tournament, but we find the opposite. In
splitting the sample for high and low ability individuals, according to their performance in the first
task and whether they are above or below the median, we find that the low ability individuals
increase performance in response to being in a tournament (significant at 1%) in the math task.
We find no significant eﬀects from tournament size for high ability individuals in the math task.21
The competitiveness of the environment has a significant impact on performance only in math
tasks and once an individual is participating in a tournament, then the number of competitors
does not lead to further performance benefits. Competitive environments (tournament size) had
no influence on the performance of individuals in the word task. Thus, depending on the type of
task, competition between individuals may increase performance. Therefore, due to mixed results,
one cannot conclude that tournament size increases performance or eﬀort of agents.
Overall, we find that a more competitive work environment may not lead to performance
increases as the incentive eﬀects of competitiveness are not robust across diﬀerent types of tasks.
Another important result shown by these regressions is that there are no significant performance
21The estimation results for high ability individuals are not shown here, but none of the competitive environment
variables were significant in these estimations.
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diﬀerences between males and females. In terms of performance eﬀects, some learning occurs across
the diﬀerent treatments and only low ability individuals tend to increase performance when they
are put in a tournament of any size– it is enough to be competing against someone.
B.1 Performance diﬀerences according to hormonal phase.
To examine performance diﬀerences across the menstrual cycle, we consider the word and math
tasks separately and estimate eﬀects using linear specifications similar to the ones used to examine
exogenous performance eﬀects of tournaments (Appendix B). Table 17 provides the random
eﬀects OLS estimates for a number of factors that may explain performance diﬀerences in both
word and math tasks for all treatments where the participants could not choose their competitive
environments. The estimations for math tasks are in columns 1 to 3 and the estimations for word
tasks are in columns 4 to 6.
There seems to be no correlation with the low-hormone phase and performance in the word task
(columns 4 to 6) for females. The Low Phase coeﬃcient is insignificant for all the diﬀerent samples
in the word task. Focusing on performance in the math task (columns 1 to 3), there seems to be
no eﬀect from the low phase in the sample of both females and males (column 1), and only females
(column 2). There seems to be some eﬀect for low phase females when including controls for risk
aversion for the portion of the particpants for which such measures were available. On average,
performance in the math task decreases by about 2.2 correct answers for low phase females when
controlling for risk aversion, which is a 20% decrease for the average female. Though the low
phase eﬀect is only significant at the 10% level when taking into account individuals for which
measures of risk aversion can be used as controls, it still suggests that anticipated performance
diﬀerences may play some role in diﬀerences in selection exhibited by females in the low phase.
Therefore, if performance or confidence diﬀerences are driving selection diﬀerences, then controlling
for performance and confidence in a discrete choice model should help isolate the eﬀect of the low
phase on selection choices.
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Table 16: RE Performance Regression of No Choice Treatments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Math Math Word Word Low Math
Task Order 0.88 0.82 3.49 3.50 1.10
(0.09) (0.09) (0.39) (0.38) (0.11)
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Tourney Size 0.13 0.04
(0.04) (0.15)
(***) ()
Tourney(ts>1) 0.63 -0.16 1.18
(0.27) (1.02) (0.31)
(**) () (***)
Tourney Size=2 -0.07 2.08 -0.24
(0.38) (1.49) (0.42)
() () ()
Tourney Size=4 -0.21 0.22 -0.73
(0.37) (1.40) (0.45)
() () ()
Female -0.45 -0.46 2.31 2.29 0.44
(0.59) (0.59) (1.87) (1.88) (0.39)
() () () () ()
Years PS -0.50 -0.50 0.16 0.15 0.17
(0.29) (0.30) (0.87) (0.87) (0.23)
(*) (*) () () ()
Age 0.40 0.40 0.33 0.34 -0.07
(0.15) (0.15) (0.49) (0.49) (0.14)
(***) (***) () () ()
GPA -0.26 -0.26 6.60 6.57 0.32
(0.63) (0.64) (1.94) (1.95) (0.41)
() () (***) (***) ()
Constant 3.22 3.39 4.11 0.00 6.43
(3.42) (3.43) (11.57) (0.00) (2.58)
() () () () (**)
Letter Controls No No Yes Yes No
Observations 534 534 492 492 303
Number of id 178 178 164 164 101
R-sq 0.0745 0.0721 0.367 0.368 0.196
chi2 102.5 104.5 565.4 570.9 136.0
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 17: Hormonal Eﬀects for Performance (t<4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample All Female Female All Female Female
Task Math Math Math Word Word Word
VARIABLES RE RE RE Risk RE RE RE Risk
Task Order 0.87 0.94 1.01 3.46 3.92 3.09
(0.09) (0.13) (0.18) (0.39) (0.57) (0.70)
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Tourney Size 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.05 -0.03 -0.20
(0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.16) (0.23) (0.29)
(***) (**) () () () ()
Low Phase -1.07 -1.09 -2.21 2.22 2.09 4.57
(0.98) (0.71) (0.89) (3.00) (2.98) (3.58)
() () (**) () () ()
Female -0.32 1.72
(0.67) (2.11)
() ()
Years PS -0.41 -0.70 -1.19 0.31 -0.87 -3.41
(0.30) (0.40) (0.52) (0.87) (1.39) (2.10)
() (*) (**) () () ()
Age 0.38 0.55 0.89 0.31 1.48 3.52
(0.15) (0.23) (0.27) (0.49) (0.90) (1.22)
(**) (**) (***) () () (***)
GPA -0.12 -0.43 -0.46 5.73 7.56 6.22
(0.65) (0.78) (1.03) (2.00) (3.19) (4.13)
() () () (***) (**) ()
Psych meds -1.48 -0.88 -1.17 3.37 4.80 3.56
(1.10) (1.19) (1.65) (3.23) (4.95) (6.78)
() () () () () ()
Constant 3.26 0.78 -3.87 6.92 -18.13 -43.30
(3.47) (4.18) (5.28) (11.70) (19.47) (26.05)
() () () () () (*)
Letter Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Risk Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 510 237 147 471 225 147
Number of id 170 79 49 157 75 49
R-sq w 0.206 0.242 0.248 0.624 0.647 0.665
R-sq b 0.0740 0.147 0.365 0.291 0.340 0.430
R-sq o 0.0909 0.168 0.339 0.369 0.410 0.496
chi2 100.5 62.28 54.45 563.4 289.1 209.3
df m 9 8 10 16 15 17
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
50
C (Not For Publication) Appendix III: Expected value from competitive
choice
To maximize expected value from choosing to compete in a tournament, or to accept the piece rate,
or to select the group pay scheme, an individual cares about his probability of winning a tournament
and his expected output. Expected values are based on the performance from Treatment 1 and the
improvement of the individual from repeating the task and being in a tournament in Treatment 2.22
Assume an exogenous probability of winning a two person tournament in the form the percentile
rank from Treatment 1 for the individual. If the individual is the best in the session then he
receives a probability of winning a tournament of 0.99 and if he is the worst performing individual
in the group his probability of winning is set to 0.01. Let this rank be equal to p. An individual’s
probability of winning an n person sized tournament is then pn−1. Let b be the base piece rate and
y be the expected output of the individual, then the expected value of an n person tournament is:
EVn = pn−1 y b n (C.1)
This expected value form includes the piece rate which is the equivalent of a tournament size of
1. For group pay selection, assume that an individual accurately predicts the mean performance
of the group. If an individual expects his output to be lower than the group average and if his
probability is less than
1
2
then he should choose the group pay compensation scheme. Otherwise
the rank ordering for the diﬀerent sized tournaments in terms of expected values is as follows:

EV6 ≥ EV4 if y > y¯ and p ≥
￿
2
3
EV4 ≥ EV6 if y > y¯ and p ≤
￿
2
3
EV2 ≥ EV4 if y > y¯ and p ≤
￿
1
2
EV1 ≥ EV2 if y > y¯ and p ≤ 12
EVGrp ≥ EVn if y ≤ y¯, ∀n ∈ {1, 2, 4, 6}

(C.2)
22For simplicity, the incentive eﬀects of eﬀort from entering a tournament are ignored in calculating these expected
values.
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D (Not For Publication) Appendix IV: Experiment Instructions
D.1 Math Task Instructions
General Instructions
In this experiment you will be performing a task five diﬀerent times. The task will consist of having
you solve 2-digit 4-number addition problems in a 4 minute period.
The addition problems will look similar to the following equation:
12 + 57 + 48 + 52 =
In some cases, you will be asked to make decisions about how you will potentially be paid for your
performance.
Only one of the five tasks will determine your payout for the experiment and it will be randomly
chosen at the end.
To answer a problem, you will simply type the numbers on the keyboard, then press enter and
another problem will appear. You can choose not to answer a question by pressing the Enter
button or clicking on submit. The answer will then be recorded as being incorrect and you will be
moved to the next problem.
To help with time management, there will be a clock counting down the seconds for the 4 minute
duration.
Task 1
For Task 1, you will be paid $0.50 for each correctly answered addition problem during the 4 minute
time limit.
You will not know how many problems you answered correctly until the end of the 4 minutes.
At the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
Once you press the button below you will be taken to a screen showing your payout method and
confirming that you understand.
The task will begin once everyone in this session is ready to begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
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Task 2
For this task, you will be randomly placed in a tournament.
The tournament will have a size of 2 or 4 or 6 people, including yourself.
If you win the tournament you will be paid $0.50 multiplied by the number of people in the
tournament for each correctly answered problem. For example, if you are in a 4 person tournament
then you will be paid $2.00 for each correct answer so long as you win the tournament.
If you do not win the tournament then you will receive nothing.
In the event of a tie for first place, you will split your tournament winnings evenly with the number
of people that tied for first place in the tournament.
You will not know who you are competing against.
You will not know how many problems you answered correctly until the end of the 4 minutes.
To help with time management, there will be a clock counting down the seconds for the 4 minute
duration. At the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
Once you press the button below you will be taken to a screen showing your tournament size and
confirming that you understand.
The task will begin once everyone in this session is ready to begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
Task 3
For this task, you will be randomly put in a group with one other person.
The group has a total size of 2 people (including yourself) and group members will be paid an equal
amount.
You will be paid according to the productivity of your group. The number of correct answers by
you and your partner will be added together and as a group you will be paid $0.50 per correct
answer. Your group earnings will be divided evenly between each partner ensuring you each get
equal pay.
You will not know who you are a partner with.
At the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance.
You will not know how many problems you answered correctly until the end of the 4 minutes.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
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Once you press the button below you will be taken to a screen showing your payout method and
confirming that you understand.
The task will begin once everyone in this session is ready to begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
Task 4
You will now have the opportunity to choose the individual pay rate of $0.50 per correct answer,
or to enter in a tournament, or to join a partner and receive the group pay rate.
Your possible choices are: Group Pay, Individual Pay, 2 Person Tournament, 4 Person Tournament,
6 Person Tournament
Whenever possible, you will be paired with other people that chose the same pay format as yourself.
If there are not enough people for your chosen format, then individuals who have selected another
pay format will be randomly selected to meet the participation requirements for your chosen format.
Tournament:
If you win the tournament, then you will be paid $0.50 multiplied by the number of people in the
tournament for each correctly answered problem. In the event of a tie for first place, you will split
your tournament winnings evenly with the number of people that tied for first in the tournament.
If you do not win the tournament then you will receive nothing.
You will not know who you are competing against.
Individual Pay:
You will be paid $0.50 for each correctly answered problem.
Group Pay:
For the Group Pay format, you will be joining one other person in a group.
You will be paid according to the productivity of your group. The number of correct answers by
you and your partner will be added together and as a group you will be paid $0.50 per correct
answer. Your group earnings will be divided evenly between each partner ensuring you each get
equal pay.
You will not know who you are a partner with.
You will not know how many problems you answered correctly until the end of the 4 minutes.
At the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
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Once you press the button below, you will be taken to a screen to make your payout method choices
and confirm that you understand.
The experiment will begin once everyone in this session is ready to begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
Task 5
Every task that you have done so far has involved no feedback about other’s performance. Now we
will provide you with feedback regarding all session participants’ performance from Task 1.
Your performance: Individual performance.
Everyone’s performance: List of everyone’s performance (high to low).
You will now have the opportunity to choose the individual pay rate of $0.50 per correct answer,
or to enter in a tournament, or to join a partner and receive the group pay rate.
Your possible choices are: Group Pay, Individual Pay, 2 Person Tournament, 4 Person Tournament,
6 Person Tournament
Whenever possible, you will be paired with other people that chose the same pay format as yourself.
If there are not enough people for your chosen format, then individuals who have selected another
pay format will be randomly selected to meet the participation requirements for your chosen format.
Tournament:
If you win the tournament, you will be paid the rate of $0.50 times the number of people in the
tournament for each correctly answered problem.
In the event of a tie for first place, you will split your tournament winnings evenly with the number
of people that tied for first in the tournament.
If you do not win the tournament then you will receive nothing.
You will not know who you are competing against.
Individual Pay:
You will be paid $0.50 for each correctly answered problem.
Group Pay:
For the Group Pay format, you will be joining one other person in a group.
You will be paid according to the productivity of your group. The number of correct answers by
you and your partner will be added together and as a group you will be paid $0.50 per correct
answer. Your group earnings will be divided evenly between each partner ensuring you each get
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equal pay.
You will not know who you are a partner with.
You will not know how many problems you answered correctly until the end of the 4 minutes.
At the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
Once you press the button below, you will be taken to a screen to make your payout method choices
and confirm that you understand.
The experiment will begin once everyone in this session is ready to begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
D.2 Word Task Instructions
General Instructions
In this experiment you will be performing a task five diﬀerent times. The task will consist of giving
you an alphabetical letter and having you type as many words as possible that begin with that
letter in a 4 minute period.
To enter a word, you will simply type the word using the keyboard, then press enter or submit. You
will then be able to enter another word. Using an English dictionary, the computer program will
verify that the words you have spelled are correct. Misspelled words will be counted as incorrect
and will not be included in your task total. During the task, you will see the words you have typed,
but you will not know if you have spelled them correctly.
• Capitalization will not aﬀect spelling.
• Duplicate words will be counted as incorrect.
• Proper names will be counted as incorrect.
• Common place names (cities, countries) will be counted as correct.
• Plurals and tense changes to root words will count as separate correct answers.
Everybody in the session will be given the same letter.
In some cases you will be asked to make decisions about how you will potentially be paid for your
performance.
Only one of the five tasks will determine your payout for the experiment and it will be randomly
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chosen at the end.
To help with time management, there will be a clock counting down the seconds for the 4 minute
duration.
Task 1
For Task 1, you will be paid $0.25 for each correctly spelled word during the 4 minute time limit.
You will be informed of how many words you spelled correctly at the end of the task.
At the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
Once you press the button below you will be taken to a screen showing your payout method and
confirming that you understand.
The task will begin once everyone in this session is ready to begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
Task 2
For this task, you will be randomly placed in a tournament.
The tournament will have a size of 2 or 4 or 6 people, including yourself.
If you win the tournament, you will be paid $0.25 multiplied by the number of people in the
tournament for each correctly spelled word you enter beginning with the designated letter.
For example, if you are in a 4 person tournament, then you will be paid $1.00 for each correctly
spelled word so long as you win the tournament.
If you do not win the tournament, then you will receive nothing.
In the event of a tie for first place, you will split your tournament winnings evenly with the number
of people that tied for first place in the tournament.
You will not know who you are competing against. Everybody in the session will be given the same
letter.
You will be informed of how many words you spelled correctly at the end of the task.
At the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
Once you press the button below you will be taken to a screen showing your payout method and
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confirming that you understand.
The task will begin once everyone in this session is ready to begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
Task 3
For this task, you will be randomly put in a group with one other person.
The group has a total size of 2 people (including yourself) and group members will be paid an equal
amount.
You will be paid according to the productivity of your group. The number of correctly spelled
words by you and your partner will be added together and as a group you will be paid $0.25 per
word. Your group earnings will be divided evenly between each partner ensuring you each get equal
pay.
You will not know who you are a partner with. Everybody in the session will be given the same
letter.
You will be informed of how many words you spelled correctly at the end of the task.
At the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
Once you press the button below you will be taken to a screen showing your payout method and
confirming that you understand.
The task will begin once everyone in this session is ready to begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
Task 4
You will now have the opportunity to choose the individual pay rate of $0.25 per correctly spelled
word, or to enter in a tournament, or to join a partner and receive the group pay rate.
Your possible choices are: Group Pay, Individual Pay, 2 Person Tournament, 4 Person Tournament,
6 Person Tournament
Whenever possible, you will be paired with other people that chose the same pay format as yourself.
If there are not enough people for your chosen format, then individuals who have selected another
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pay format will be randomly selected to meet the participation requirements for your chosen format.
Tournament:
If you win the tournament, then you will be paid $0.25 multiplied by the number of people in the
tournament for each correctly spelled word. In the event of a tie for first place, you will split your
tournament winnings evenly with the number of people that tied for first in the tournament.
If you do not win the tournament then you will receive nothing.
You will not know who you are competing against.
Individual Pay:
You will be paid $0.25 for each correctly spelled word.
Group Pay:
For the Group Pay format, you will be joining one other person in a group.
You will be paid according to the productivity of your group. The number of correctly spelled
words by you and your partner will be added together and as a group you will be paid $0.25 per
correctly spelled word. Your group earnings will be divided evenly between each partner ensuring
you each get equal pay.
You will not know who you are a partner with. Everybody in the session will be given the same
letter. You will be informed of how many words you spelled correctly at the end of the task. At
the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
Once you press the button below you will be taken to a screen to make your payout method choices
and confirming that you understand.
The task will begin once everyone in this session is ready to begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
Task 5
Every task that you have done so far has involved no feedback about other’s performance. Now we
will provide you with feedback regarding all session participants’ performance from Task 1.
Your performance: Individual performance.
Everyone’s performance: List of everyone’s performance (high to low).
You will have the opportunity to choose the individual pay rate of $0.25 per correctly spelled word,
or to enter in a tournament, or to join a partner and receive the group pay rate.
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Your possible choices are: Group Pay, Individual Pay, 2 Person Tournament, 4 Person Tournament,
6 Person Tournament
Whenever possible, you will be paired with other people that chose the same pay format as yourself.
If there are not enough people for your chosen format, then individuals who have selected another
pay format will be randomly selected to meet the participation requirements for your chosen format.
Tournament:
If you win the tournament, you will be paid the rate of $0.25 multiplied by the number of people
in the tournament for each correctly spelled word.
In the event of a tie for first place, you will split your tournament winnings evenly with the number
of people that tied for first in the tournament.
If you do not win the tournament then you will receive nothing.
You will not know who you are competing against.
Individual Pay:
You will be paid $0.25 for each correctly spelled word you submit.
Group Pay:
For the Group Pay format, you will be joining one other person in a group.
You will be paid according to the productivity of your group. The number of correctly spelled
words by you and your partner will be added together and as a group you will be paid $0.25 per
word. Your group earnings will be divided evenly between each partner ensuring you each get equal
pay.
You will not know who you are a partner with.
Everybody in the session will be given the same letter. You will be informed of how many words
you spelled correctly at the end of the task. At the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking
about your performance.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
Once you press the button below you will be taken to a screen to make your payout method choices
and confirming that you understand. The task will begin once everyone in this session is ready to
begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
60
